.YE ccTLD – 向 ICANN/IANA 提交的正式转授权请求
6 分•作者: FreeTheDotYE•8 个月前
我们是 FreeTheDotYE 运动，这是一项由志愿者主导的行动，旨在解决互联网治理中长期存在的问题。我们已向 ICANN/IANA 提交正式请求，要求重新委任也门国家代码顶级域名 (.YE)。
完整的请求可以在这里查看：
https://freethedotye.org/letter
核心问题：
IANA 根区数据库将 TeleYemen 列为 .YE ccTLD 的管理者。自 2014-2015 年胡塞武装占领萨那以来，TeleYemen 的基础设施一直处于他们的控制之下。这意味着一个非国家武装团体是主权国家数字标识符的实际运营者。
重新委任的依据（RFC 1591 和 ICP-1）：
我们的请求基于既定的互联网治理原则，而目前的运营者显然违反了这些原则：
1. RFC 1591：要求 ccTLD 管理者作为受托人服务于整个当地社区。
2. ICP-1：要求运营者保持中立、胜任，并服务于公共利益。
可证明的治理失败和现实世界的滥用：
* 未能服务社区：.YE 命名空间仅服务于胡塞武装。也门国际公认的政府和公民社会被迫使用通用 TLD（.com、.org），而民兵运营的门户网站则占据了 .gov.ye 和 .edu.ye。
* 武器化用于军事和勒索目的：对 `.gov.ye` 命名空间的控制权被积极用于威胁国际海运。胡塞武装在 `hocc.gov.ye`（人道主义行动协调中心）建立了网站，作为其海事行动的幌子。通过该网站和相关的电子邮件，如 `info@navy.gov.ye`，他们发出军事威胁，并在国家机构的幌子下进行数字勒索。这是直接滥用国家资源进行军事胁迫。
* 丧失中立性：.YE 域名被用于运营宣传机构（例如 saba.ye），并且同一机构利用其对电信的控制权来审查和监视活动人士。
* 不稳定和风险：控制 .YE 的实体被记录有严重侵犯人权的行为，包括绑架记者和拘留联合国工作人员。与此类行为相关的运营者不能被视为稳定或值得信赖的管理者。
我们向 ICANN 提出的正式请求：
1. 启动对 .YE 委任的正式审查。
2. 在稳定、合法的国家机构可以接管管理权之前，暂时将 .YE 重新委任给一个中立的国际受托人。这有先例可循（例如，.SO 索马里重新委任）。
这是一个关键的考验，检验了多方利益相关者、社区主导的互联网原则是否能够在冲突地区站稳脚跟，而 ccTLD 已被变成战争工具。
链接：
* 运动网站：https://freethedotye.org
* X 个人资料：https://x.com/FreeTheDotYE
查看原文
We are the FreeTheDotYE campaign, a volunteer-led effort to address a long-standing failure in internet governance. We have submitted a formal request to ICANN/IANA for the redelegation of Yemen's country-code top-level domain (.YE).<p>The full request can be viewed here:<p>https://freethedotye.org/letter<p>The Core Problem:<p>The IANA Root Zone Database lists TeleYemen as the manager for the .YE ccTLD. Since the Houthi militia's takeover of Sana'a in 2014-2015, TeleYemen's infrastructure has been under their control. This means a non-state armed group is the de facto operator of a sovereign nation's digital identifier.<p>The Basis for Redelegation (RFC 1591 & ICP-1):<p>Our request is grounded in established internet governance principles that the current operator has clearly violated:<p>1. RFC 1591: Requires a ccTLD manager to serve the <i>entire</i> local community as a trustee.<p>2. ICP-1: Requires the operator to be neutral, competent, and serve the public interest.<p>Demonstrable Governance Failures & Real-World Abuse:<p>* Failure to Serve the Community: The .YE namespace exclusively serves the Houthi militia. Yemen's internationally recognized government and civil society are forced onto generic TLDs (.com, .org), while militia-run portals occupy .gov.ye and .edu.ye.<p>* Weaponization for Military and Extortionist Purposes: The control over the `.gov.ye` namespace is being actively used to threaten international maritime shipping. The Houthis have established a website at `hocc.gov.ye` (Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center) which acts as a front for their maritime operations. Through this site and associated emails like `info@navy.gov.ye`, they issue military threats and run what amounts to a digital extortion racket under the guise of a state authority. This is a direct abuse of a national resource for military coercion.<p>* Loss of Neutrality: The .YE domain is used to run propaganda outlets (e.g., saba.ye), and the same authority uses its control over telecommunications to censor and surveil activists.<p>* Instability and Risk: The entity controlling .YE is documented for severe human rights abuses, including the kidnapping of journalists and detention of UN staff. An operator associated with such acts cannot be considered a stable or trusted steward.<p>Our Formal Request to ICANN:<p>1. Initiate a formal review of the .YE delegation.<p>2. Temporarily redelegate .YE to a neutral international trustee until a stable, legitimate national authority can assume stewardship. There is a precedent for this (e.g., the .SO Somalia redelegation).<p>This is a critical test of whether the principles of a multi-stakeholder, community-led internet can hold in a conflict zone where a ccTLD has been turned into an instrument of war.<p>Links:<p>- Campaign Website: https://freethedotye.org<p>- X profile: https://x.com/FreeTheDotYE